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Uniform-price assignment markets
Abstract: Uniform–price assignment games are introduced as those assignment mar-
kets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents,
competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A char-
acterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets
where all submarkets are uniform are the Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets. We prove
that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise
bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus.
Key words: assignment game, core, Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, kernel
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Resum: Els jocs d’assignacio´ amb preu uniforme so´n aquells mercats d’assignacio´
on el core es redueix a un segment. En aquests casos, per a tots els agents actius
en el mercat, els preus competitius varien de forma uniforme, tot i que els productes
poden ser no homogenis. En aquest treball es dona una caracteritzacio´ dels mercats
amb preu uniforme a partir de la matriu d’assignacio´. Els u´nics mercats on tots els
subjocs so´n de preu uniforme so´n els mercats de cavalls de Bo¨hm-Bawerk. Finalment,
provem que en aquests mercats de preu uniforme el kernel, o conjunt de pagaments
que s’obtenen a partir d’un proce´s de negociacio´ bilateral i sime`tric, o be´ coincideix
amb tot core o es redueix al seu punt mig que e´s el nucleolus.
1 Introduction
In an assignment market, two disjoint sets of agents exist, let us say buyers and
sellers, and when a buyer is paired with a seller an additional value is created. The
first problem is to find an optimal matching, that is to say an assignment of buyers
to sellers that maximizes the total profit. The second one is to know how the output
of each pairing will be divided between the two agents involved in the trade. It is
assumed in such markets that the goods traded are indivisible and heterogeneous,
and utilities are transferable. The difference between what the object sold is worth
to the buyer and the minimum that would be accepted by the seller must be divided
between them by determining a price. Thus, one of the most interesting questions
regarding the classical assignment market is that of the formation of prices.
Given a matching of buyers to sellers, a vector of incomes that allocates the
output of each pairing between the corresponding paired agents is said to be stable
if no other mixed-pair formed by a buyer and a seller could produce together more
than the sum of their incomes. In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduce the assignment
game as a cooperative model for two–sided markets with transferable utility. They
prove that assignment games have a non empty core and it coincides with the set of
stable allocations. Moreover, the core turns out to be in one–to–one correspondence
with the set of competitive price vectors.
Before that, Bo¨hm–Bawerk had carried out a deep analysis of some very sim-
ple markets which are now known as Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets. After Shapley
and Shubik (1972), Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets appear as a particular case of an
assignment market when there is no product differentiation. In the Bo¨hm–Bawerk
horse market each buyer places the same valuation on each one of the objects and
in equilibrium all transactions take place at the same price. There is then no possi-
bility of price discrimination in those assignment markets where there is no product
differentiation. In fact, Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that, in the Bo¨hm–Bawerk
horse market, the core is a segment and consequently the set of competitive prices is
also one–dimensional. The term uniform prices is already used there.
The aim of the present paper is thus to study those markets where although the
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buyers discriminate between the objects (each buyer may place different values on
different objects), the prices still behave uniformly (that is, they move in a segment).
More formally, we will analyze those assignment markets where the core reduces to
a segment, not necessarily being Bo¨hm–Bawerk markets.
Section 2 presents the definitions and notations for the assignment model that
will be needed in the paper. Section 3 defines the uniform–price assignment games
as those assignment games with a one–dimensional core, and gives a characterization
of these games in terms of their matrix. In Section 4 we analyze when an assignment
market is such that every submarket is also uniform–price and prove that this only
happens in the case of Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets.
Although it reduces to a segment, there are still infinitely many possible alloca-
tions in the core of a uniform-price assignment game. A way of selecting some core
allocations of an assignment market with additional stability properties is to con-
sider the set of pairwise–bargained allocations introduced by Rochford (1984), which
coincides with the kernel of the game. In Section 4 we compute the set of pairwise–
bargained allocations of a uniform–price assignment game, and it turns out that this
set either coincides with the core or reduces to the midpoint of the core.
2 The assignment model
Let M be a finite set of buyers and M ′ a finite set of sellers and let us denote by m
and m′ their cardinalities. We may think of the formal model of assignment games
as arising from a situation where each seller j ∈ M ′ has an object for sale which
he valuates in cj ∈ R+ (reservation price of seller j ), being R+ the set of non
negative real numbers, while each buyer i ∈ M wants exactly one indivisible object
and places a value of hij ∈ R+ in the object offered by seller j , hi = (hij)j∈M ′ .
Then, if h = (hi)i∈M and c = (cj)j∈M ′ , a matrix A = A(h, c) = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ is
defined, where aij = max{hij − cj, 0} are the potential gains from the trade between
i and j. We will denote by Mm×m′(R+) the set of non negative matrices with m
rows and m′ columns. An assignment market is then a triple (M,M ′, A) .
A matching (or assignment) between M and M ′ (or a matching for A ) is a
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subset µ of M ×M ′ such that each k ∈ M ∪M ′ belongs to at most one pair in
µ . We will denote by M(A) the set of matchings of A . A matching µ is optimal if
for all µ′ ∈ M(A) , ∑(i,j)∈µ aij ≥ ∑(i,j)∈µ′ aij and we denote by M∗(A) the set of
optimal matchings.
The above two–sided market can be described by means of a cooperative game
where the player set consists of the union M ∪M ′ of the sets of buyers and sellers.
Then, m+m′ is the cardinality of the player set. The profits of mixed–pair coalitions,
{i, j} where i ∈ M and j ∈ M ′ , are wA(i, j) = aij ≥ 0 , and the matrix A also
determines the worth of any other coalition S ∪ T , where S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ , in
the following way: wA(S ∪ T ) = max{
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij | µ ∈ M(S, T )} , M(S, T ) being
the set of matchings between S and T . It will be assumed as usual that a coalition
formed only by sellers or only by buyers has worth zero. Moreover, we say a buyer
i ∈M is not assigned by µ if (i, j) 6∈ µ for all j ∈M ′ (and similarly for sellers). We
denote by µ(i) the seller j such that (i, j) ∈ µ and then we also write i = µ−1(j) .
Shapley and Shubik (1972) prove that the core, C(wA) , of the assignment game
(M ∪M ′, wA) is nonempty and coincides with the set of stable outcomes. This means
that given any optimal matching µ of M ∪M ′ , a payoff vector (u, v) ∈ RM+ ×RM ′+
is in the core if ui+ vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ , ui+ vj ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ ,
and the payoff to any agent not matched by µ is zero.
Moreover, the core has a lattice structure with two special extreme core alloca-
tions: the buyers–optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each buyer attains her max-
imum core payoff, and the sellers–optimal core allocation, (u, v) , where each seller
does. Notice that, when agents on one side of the market obtain their maximum core
payoff, the agents on the opposite side obtain their minimum core payoff, as the joint
payoff of an optimally matched pair is fixed.
From Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) we know that the maximum core payoff
of any player coincides with his marginal contribution:
ui = wA(N)− wA(N \ {i}) and vj = wA(N)− wA(N \ {j}) (1)
for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ M ′ . As a consequence, for each optimally matched pair
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(i, j) , the minimum core payoffs are
ui = wA(M ∪M ′ \ {j})− wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i, j}) and
vj = wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i})− wA(M ∪M ′ \ {i, j}) .
(2)
The present paper is devoted to the analysis of those assignment games which have
a segment as a core, the segment with extreme points the buyers–optimal and the
sellers–optimal core allocations. It is important to point out that different assignment
games may have the same core. For instance, if there exists a matrix entry aij which
is not attained by any core allocation, ui + vj > aij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , then the
worth of aij can be slightly raised without changing the core. It is shown in Nu´n˜ez
and Rafels (2002) that for every assignment matrix A there exists a unique matrix
Ar such that C(wA) = C(wAr) and wAr is buyer–seller exact, which means that for
all (i, j) ∈M ×M ′ there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) with ui + vj = arij . Thus no entry
in Ar can be raised without changing the core.
If we assume that A is square, and this can always been achieved by adding
dummy players, then the entries in matrix Ar , once fixed an optimal matching µ ,
are
arij = aiµ(i) + aµ−1(j)j + wA(M ∪M ′ \ {µ−1(j), µ(i)})− wA(M ∪M ′) . (3)
Moreover, an assignment game (M ∪M ′, wA) is buyer–seller exact (A = Ar ) if and
only if its matrix A is doubly dominant diagonal, which means that aij + akµ(k) ≥
aiµ(k) + akj for all i, k ∈M and j ∈M ′ .
A particular case of assignment market is a glove market. In a glove market
(Shapley, 1959), not only goods are homogeneous but, in addition to that, all buyers
have the same valuation for them all, and all sellers have the same reservation price.
Then an assignment market (M, M ′, A) is a glove market if aij = c ≥ 0 for all
i ∈M and all j ∈M ′ . Those glove markets where the number of buyers differs from
the number of sellers have only one core point, where each agent on the short side
of the market gets c while agents on the large side get zero. If there are as many
buyers as sellers, the core is a line segment where each agent can obtain any amount
from zero to c . We will now extend this notion by allowing for some dummy agents
in the glove market.
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Definition 1 An assignment market (M, M ′, A) is an extended glove market if
there exists a subset of buyers M1 ⊆ M and a subset of sellers M ′1 ⊆ M ′ such that
aij = c ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈M1 ×M ′1 and aij = 0 if i 6∈M1 or j 6∈M ′1 .
If |M1| = |M ′1| we say the game is an extended square glove market.
The core of the extended square glove market is also a segment, where all i ∈
M \M1 and all j ∈M ′ \M ′1, receive zero payoff in any core allocation. These games
will play an important representative role in the next section.
To end this section, we recall the definitions of competitive prices and competitive
equilibrium. As a notational convention, we assume in this definition that M ′ con-
tains an artificial agent 0 the object of whom has null value, hi0 = 0 for all i ∈M .
Several buyers may buy the object of seller 0. A feasible price vector is p ∈ Rm′+
such that pj ≥ cj for all j ∈M ′ \ {0} , where cj is the reservation price of seller j ,
and p0 = 0 . Once fixed a feasible price p , the demand set for buyer i ∈M at price
p is defined by Di(p) = {j ∈ M ′ | hij − pj = maxk∈M ′{hik − pk}} . Now, a price
vector p is quasi-competitive if there is a matching µ ∈M(A) such that if µ(i) = j
then j ∈ Di(p) and if i is not matched by µ then 0 ∈ Di(p) . Then µ is said to be
compatible with price p . Finally, the pair (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium if p is
quasi-competitive, µ is compatible with p and pj = cj for all j not matched by µ .
We then say that p is an equilibrium price vector.
It is easy to check that if (p, µ) is a competitive equilibrium then the correspond-
ing payoffs (u, v) are stable, where ui = hij − pj , if (i, j) ∈ µ , and vj = pj − cj for
all j ∈ M ′ \ {0} . Conversely, if (u, v) is stable and pj = vj + cj for all j ∈ M ′ ,
then p is an equilibrium price vector.
3 Uniform–price assignment markets: definition
and characterization
We introduce now those assignment markets which have a segment as a core as
uniform–price assignment markets.
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Definition 2 An assignment market (M, M ′, A) is uniform–price if and only if the
core is a segment, that is to say
C(wA) = [(u, v), (u, v)] = {λ(u, v) + (1− λ)(u, v) , λ ∈ [0, 1] }.
Notice that in the above definition those assignment games where the competitive
equilibrium price is unique are also included. In these games the core shrinks as much
as possible.
We know from Shapley and Shubik (1972) that Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets are
uniform–price assignment games. We will see in the next section that if we consider
2 × 2 matrices, all uniform–price markets are Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets, but
for higher dimensions both classes differ. The assignment game with set of buyers
M = {1, 2, 3} , set of sellers M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′} and defined by matrix
A1 =

1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1

has a one–dimensional core C(wA1) = [(1, 1, 1; 0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0; 1, 1, 1)] , but is not a
Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market. To see that, notice that from a11′ = a21′ we deduce
that buyers 1 and 2 have the same valuation for the object of seller 1’, but this enters
in contradiction with a12′ 6= a22′ .
In the above example, we can rise the entry a12′ in one unit to obtain a Bo¨hm–
Bawerk horse market with the same core. This fact might suggest that the existence
of uniform–price assignment games which are not horse markets is only caused by
the lack of exactness and that given any such game A , its buyer–seller exact repre-
sentative Ar (see Nu´n˜ez and Rafels, 2002) is always a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market.
However, this is not the case, as it is shown by matrix
A2 =

8 8 5
8 9 6
2 3 0
 . (4)
It is easily obtained that C(wA2) = [(5, 6, 0; 3, 3, 0), (6, 6, 0; 2, 3, 0)] and it can then
be noticed that every matrix entry is attained in some extreme core allocation, which
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means that wA2 is buyer–seller exact. But the same argument used for matrix A1
shows that A2 does neither define a Bo¨hm-Bawerk horse market.
If (M, M ′, A) is an arbitrary assignment market, let us denote by I0 the subset
of buyers with fixed core payoff, and J0 the subset of sellers with the same property:
I0 = {i ∈M | ui = ui } and J0 = {j ∈M | vj = vj } .
Recall that (u, v) can be obtained as the solution of a few linear programs, since all
buyers achieve their maximum core payoff in the same core allocation, and the same
happens with (u, v) . Consequently, the sets I0 and J0 are easily determined even
for assignment games with large number of players.
Agents in I0 or J0 can be assumed to be non-active as, although they may take
part of some transaction, they have no bargaining capability as their core payoff is
fixed. Then, agents in M \ I0 or M ′ \ J0 are active agents. Let µ be any optimal
matching for A . Notice first that if i is not matched by µ , then ui = 0 for all
(u, v) ∈ C(wA) , and thus i ∈ I0 . Also j ∈ J0 if j is not matched by µ . Moreover,
if i ∈ I0 and (i, j) ∈ µ for some µ ∈ M∗(A) , then from ui + vj = ui + vj = aij
follows vj = vj and thus j ∈ J0 . Similarly, if j ∈ J0 and (i, j) ∈ µ , µ ∈ M∗(A) ,
then i ∈ I0 . This implies that the number of active players is always even and we
will sometimes refer to any pair (i, j) formed by active agents as an active pair.
Since the core of an assignment game is always a 45o–lattice (Quint, 1991), given a
uniform-price assignment market (M, M ′, A) , its core segment cannot have arbitrary
slopes: the core payoffs to the active buyers must be of the type u − ε · 1 , where
1 ∈ Rm gives unitary payoff to any active buyer and null payoff to any non-active
one, and 0 ≤ ε ≤ K for some fixed K ≥ 0 . Thus, the core can be described by
C(wA) =

(u, v) ∈ Rm+m′+
ui = ui for i ∈ I0 ,
ui = ui − ε for i ∈M \ I0 ,
vj = vj for j ∈ J0 ,
vj = vj + ε for j ∈M ′ \ J0 ,
for some ε ∈ [0, K]

(5)
where K = ui − ui = vj − vj for all i ∈M \ I0 and j ∈M ′ \ J0 .
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Notice that the prices of those transactions between active agents are described
by the single parameter ε : once fixed an arbitrary j ∈ M ′ \ J0 , pj = cj + vj + ε .
We then say that prices vary uniformly.
The next theorem characterizes the uniform–price assignment markets in terms of
the assignment matrix, under the assumption that A is square. Notice that this can
always be achieved by adding null rows or columns, and this action does not modify
the dimension of the core. Recall also that the minimum core payoff of each agent
can be easily computed from the matrix, by using equations (2).
Theorem 3 Let (M, M ′, A) be an assignment market with as many buyers as sell-
ers, Ar the unique buyer–seller exact matrix such that C(wA) = C(wAr) and let
it be A = (aij)(i,j)∈M×M ′ where aij = ui + vj . Then the following statements are
equivalent:
1. (M, M ′, A) is uniform–price.
2. Ac = Ar − A defines an extended square glove market.
Proof: 1⇒ 2) Since (M∪M ′, wA) is a uniform–price assignment game, Ar defines
a buyer–seller exact assignment game such that C(wA) = C(wAr) is a segment. For
all (i, j) ∈ M ×M ′ , there exists (u, v) ∈ C(wA) such that arij = ui + vj ≥ ui + vj
and consequently Ac ≥ 0 . Moreover, if (i, j) ∈ M × M ′ with i ∈ I0 , we get
arij ≥ ui+vj = ui+vj . But, being (u, v) a core allocation, it must hold arij = ui+vj ,
and then acij = 0 . The same happens if j ∈ J0 . Finally, as C(wAr) is a segment,
from (5) follows that, if i ∈M and j ∈M ′ are active, ui+ vj = u′i+ v′j for any pair
of core allocations (u, v) and (u′, v′) and consequently, from buyer–seller exactness,
ui + vj = a
r
ij for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) . In particular, ui + vj = arij .
Then, for i ∈M \ I0 and j ∈M ′ \ J0 ,
acij = a
r
ij − ui − vj = ui + vj − ui − vj = vj − vj = K > 0 ,
which proves Ac is an extended square glove market.
2⇒ 1) Assume now Ar = A+Ac , where Ac is an extended square glove market.
We prove first that any optimal matching µ ∈ M∗(Ac) which is maximal, in the
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sense that all agents are matched by µ , is also optimal for Ar . To see that, take any
µ ∈ M∗(Ac) and maximal. This can always be achieved since Ac is square. Then∑
(i,j)∈µ a
c
ij =
∑
(i,j)∈µ a
r
ij −
∑
i∈M ui −
∑
j∈M ′ vj . Moreover, for any µ
′ ∈M(Ac) ,∑
(i,j)∈µ
acij ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ′
acij =
∑
(i,j)∈µ′
arij −
∑
(i,j)∈µ′
(ui + vj) ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ′
arij −
∑
i∈M
ui −
∑
j∈M ′
vj ,
which implies
∑
(i,j)∈µ a
r
ij ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ′ a
r
ij , and µ ∈M∗(Ar) .
Now, we prove that C(wAr) ⊆ (u, v) + C(wAc) = {(u, v) ∈ Rm+m′|(u, v) =
(u, v) + (u′, v′) and (u′, v′) ∈ C(wAc) }. To see that, for all (u, v) ∈ C(wAr) define
(u′, v′) in the following way:
u′i = ui − ui for all i ∈M and v′j = vj − vj for all j ∈M ′ .
Let us see that (u′, v′) ∈ C(wAc) . Notice first that u′i ≥ 0 and v′j ≥ 0 . Taking
an arbitrary maximal optimal matching µ ∈ M∗(Ac) , u′i + v′j = acij if (i, j) ∈
µ , since we also have µ ∈ M∗(Ar) . Moreover, for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ M ′ ,
u′i+ v
′
j = ui− ui+ vj − vj ≥ arij − ui− vj = acij . Then (u, v) = (u, v) + (u′, v′) where
(u′, v′) ∈ C(wAc) , which proves that C(wAr) ⊆ (u, v) + C(wAc) .
As Ac defines an extended square glove market, C(wAc) is a segment and, from
the above argument, C(wAr) is included in the translation of C(wAc) by the vector
(u, v) and thus C(wAr) = C(wA) is also a segment. 2
Let us remark that, by the proof of the above theorem, we get that given a
uniform-price assignment market (M,M ′, A) and its related extended square glove
market Ac , acij = 0 if and only if i or j are non-active.
Theorem 3 shows that any uniform–price assignment market, after exactification
(Ar ) and substraction of the minimum core payoffs (A ), gives an extended square
glove market where only active pairs have a positive output. For instance, if we take
again matrix A2 in expression (4), which is buyer–seller exact, the corresponding
extended glove market is Ac2 = A2 − A2 =

1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 .
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Let us look into another example. Consider a market with four buyers and four
sellers, M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and M ′ = {1′, 2′, 3′, 4′}, described by matrix
A3 =

9 8 0 4
8 7 0 0
0 0 3 2
3 0 1 0
 (6)
which is not buyer–seller exact. To see that, just notice that an optimal matching
is placed in the diagonal and a13′ + a22′ < a12′ + a23′ shows that A3 is not doubly
dominant diagonal. If we compute the marginal contribution of each agent and
take into account the aforementioned optimal matching, we get the buyers–optimal
core allocation (u, v) = (6, 5, 2, 0; 3, 2, 1, 0) and the sellers–optimal core allocation
(u, v) = (4, 3, 2, 0; 5, 4, 1, 0) . How to know if these are the unique extreme allocations
in C(wA3) ?
The first step is to compute the matrix Ar3 by means of equation (3). Then,
ar13′ = a11′ + a33′ + wA3(M ∪M ′ \ {3, 1′})− wA3(M ∪M ′) = 5
ar23′ = a22′ + a33′′ + wA3(M ∪M ′ \ {3, 2′})− wA3(M ∪M ′) = 4
ar24′ = a22′ + a44′ + wA3(M ∪M ′ \ {4, 2′})− wA3(M ∪M ′) = 3 .
Similarly, ar31′ = 5 , a
r
32′ = 4 , a
r
42′ = 2 and a
r
ij = aij otherwise, which leads to
Ar3 =

9 8 5 4
8 7 4 3
5 4 3 2
3 2 1 0
 .
On the other hand, as (u, v) = (4, 3, 2, 0; 3, 2, 1, 0) , the matrix A3 is
A3 =

7 6 5 4
6 5 4 3
5 4 3 2
3 2 1 0

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and consequently
Ac3 = A
r
3 − A3 =

2 2 0 0
2 2 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 .
Now, from Theorem 3 follows that A3 is a uniform–price assignment game where
only the two first agents on each side of the market are active.
Finally, as a consequence of Theorem 3 we see that the equilibrium price vector is
unique if and only if Ar = A , which means that the buyer–seller exactification (but
maybe not the original matrix) is additively generated by the minimum core payoffs.
4 Totally uniform-price assignment markets
In this section we look for those uniform-price assignment markets where all subgames
also have uniform prices. A well known example of that are the Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse
markets. We ask whether these are the only assignment markets with this property.
The Horse Market of Bo¨hm–Bawerk (1891) is also studied from the viewpoint of
game theory in Shapley and Shubik (1972). In this market, each seller has one horse
for sale and each buyer wishes to buy one horse and places the same valuation in
all the horses available, as they are all alike. Let 0 ≤ c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cm′ be the
reservation prices of the sellers and h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ hm ≥ 0 the valuations of the
buyers. If hi < cj , no transaction is possible between these two agents but whenever
hi ≥ cj , agents i and j can trade and obtain a joint profit of hi − cj . Thus, the
assignment matrix describing this market is defined by aij = max{hi − cj, 0} .
It is already known from Shapley and Shubik (1972) that the core of the Bo¨hm–
Bawerk horse market game consists of a segment, with extreme points the buyers–
optimal and the sellers–optimal core allocations. Moreover, in a core allocation all
transactions take place at the same price. This means that there exists an interval
of prices [p, p] such that (u, v) ∈ C(wA) if and only if there exists p ∈ [p, p] and
ui = hi − p and vj = p− cj (7)
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if buyer i and seller j are involved in some transaction, while the remaining agents
receive a zero payoff.
In this section, given an arbitrary assignment matrix, we will need to recognize,
merely by inspection of the matrix entries, if it represents such a particular market as
the Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market. To this end we will develop an idea already present
in the work of Shapley and Shubik (1972), who point out that a property of the
assignment matrix of these particular markets is that in each 2 × 2 submatrix with
nonzero entries, the sums of the diagonals are equal. This property is not enough
to characterize the matrices defining a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market (see for instance
matrix A1 ).
However, it is not difficult to prove that a 2 × 2 assignment matrix defines a
Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market if and only if either two optimal matchings exist or
there is only one optimal matching but one of the optimally matched pairs has a null
outcome. Thus, 2 × 2 matrices defining a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market are, up to
possible permutations of buyers or sellers,
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 with a11+ a22 = a12+ a21 ,
or
 a11 a12
a21 0
 with a11 ≥ a12 + a21 .
The next corollary, which is a consequence of Theorem 3, states that the class
of uniform-price assignment markets coincides with the class of Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse
markets if we restrict to 2× 2 matrices. We leave the proof for the appendix.
Corollary 4 Every uniform-price assignment market defined by a 2× 2 matrix is a
Bo¨hm-Bawerk horse market.
Notice that, unlike what happens with Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets, the sub-
games of a uniform–price assignment market, need not be uniform–price. Take for
instance the submatrix
 1 0
1 1
 from A1 =

1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
 and notice that it de-
fines an assignment game with a two–dimensional core.
We name totally uniform–price assignment markets those assignment markets
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such that every submarket is also uniform–price. Next theorem states that this
property characterizes the Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets.
Theorem 5 Let (M, M ′, A) be an assignment market. The following statements
are equivalent:
1. (M, M ′, A) is totally uniform–price,
2. (M, M ′, A) is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market.
Proof: If (M,M ′, A) is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, then all subgames are also
Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets, and thus they are all uniform–price.
To prove the converse statement notice first that if one side of the market has
only one agent, then trivially the market is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market. So, let
us assume that (M,M ′, A) is a totally uniform–price assignment market with at
least two agents on each side. Then every 2× 2–subgame is also uniform-price and,
by Corollary 4, it is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market. We claim that this property
characterizes the Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse markets:
Claim: If A ∈ Mm×m′(R+) is such that every 2 × 2 submatrix defines a Bo¨hm–
Bawerk horse market, then A also defines a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market.
The proof of this claim is done in the appendix. 2
5 The kernel or symmetrically pairwise–bargained
allocations
In this second part of the paper, we analyze which core allocations of a uniform-price
assignment game are supported by another cooperative set-solution concept as it is
the kernel of the game. The kernel of a cooperative game (Davis and Maschler, 1965)
is always nonempty and it always contains the nucleolus, a single-valued solution
concept introduced by Schmeidler (1969).
The first analysis of the kernel of an assignment game, K(wA) , is carried out by
Rochford (1984) where the optimally matched players are engaged in bargaining of
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the sort modelled by Nash, using as their threats the maximum they could receive in
an alternative matching. A symmetrically pairwise–bargained (SPB) allocation is a
core allocation such that all partners are in bargained equilibrium. Rochford proves
that an SPB allocation always exists and that the set of SPB allocations coincides
with the intersection of the kernel and the core of the assignment game. Once proved,
for assignment games, the inclusion of the kernel in the core (Driessen, 1998), it turns
out that the set of SPB allocations is the kernel of the game.
Given an assignment game (M ∪ M ′, wA) , it is easy to see, and it is justified
in Rochford (1984), that once fixed an optimal matching µ ∈ M∗(A) and given
(u, v) ∈ C(wA) , we get that (u, v) ∈ K(wA) if and only if sij(u, v) = sji(u, v)
for all (i, j) ∈ µ , where sij(u, v) = max{−ui, aij′ − ui − vj′ , ∀j′ ∈ M ′ \ {j}} and
sji(u, v) = max{−vj, ai′j − ui′ − vj, ∀i′ ∈ M \ {i}} . In fact, since the kernel of an
assignment game is included in its core, the above equalities characterize the kernel
of the assignment game:
K(wA) = {(u, v) ∈ C(wA) | sij(u, v) = sji(u, v) , for all (i, j) ∈ µ} .
In these markets, the kernel can be viewed as those imputations for which any two
optimally matched players are equally powerful concerning their mutual threats. We
want to remark the fact that, unlike the case of arbitrary coalitional games, to com-
pute the kernel of an assignment game, only the excesses of individual coalitions and
mixed-pair coalitions are to be taken into account and, moreover, equilibrium is only
required for pairs of agents which are optimally matched.
Our aim in this section is to prove that the kernel of a uniform–price assignment
game either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus. This is not true for
arbitrary assignment games: an example can be found in Granot and Granot (1992)
of an assignment game with a kernel which is not a convex set.
If no active pair exists, then the core of the assignment market reduces to only
one point and, since the kernel is always nonempty, it coincides with the kernel (and
also with the nucleolus). We can thus assume that at least one active pair exists.
Theorem 6 Let (M ∪M ′, wA) be a uniform–price assignment game with at least
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one active pair. Then, the kernel K(wA) either coincides with the core or reduces to
only one point. This last case happens if and only if a unique active pair exists.
Proof: We will assume without loss of generality, that A is buyer–seller exact, A =
Ar , since by Nu´n˜ez (2004) we know that K(wA) = K(wAr) . Once fixed µ ∈M∗(A) ,
let us prove first that if (i, j) ∈ µ is a non-active pair, then sij(u, v) = sji(u, v) for
all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) . To do that, we consider two cases.
Case 1: Assume first that (i, j) ∈ µ is a non-active pair but it is not the only
one. Since there exists j′ 6= j non-active, aij′ − ui − vj′ = aij′ − ui − vj′ = 0
for all (u, v) ∈ C(wA) , where the second equality follows from the fact that wA is
buyer–seller exact. Thus, sij(u, v) = 0 and, by the same argument, sji(u, v) = 0 .
Case 2: Assume now that (i, j) ∈ µ is the unique non-active pair. For all (u, v) ∈
C(wA) , either ui = 0 or if ui > 0 we claim that there exists j
′ ∈M ′ \{j} such that
aij′−ui−vj′ = 0 . To prove the claim notice that if ui > 0 and aij′−ui−vj′ < 0 for
all j′ ∈M \{j} , then we could choose ε > 0 small enough so that (u′, v′) ∈ Rm+m′ ,
defined by u′i = ui − ε , v′j = vj + ε , u′k = uk for k ∈ M \ {i} , and v′l = vl for
l ∈M ′ \ {j} , would be a core allocation. Since ui 6= u′i and both (u, v) and (u′, v′)
belong to the core, this contradicts that i is a non-active buyer. Once proved the
claim, we have that also in this case sij(u, v) = 0 , and the same argument applies to
obtain sji(u, v) = 0 .
At this point we can state that to know if a core allocation (u, v) belongs to the
kernel of a buyer-seller exact assignment game you only need to check the constraints
sij(u, v) = sji(u, v) for those (i, j) ∈ µ formed by active agents. We now consider
the two cases that appear in the statement of the theorem.
Let us now assume there exists more than one active pair. Take (i, j) ∈ µ an
active pair and consider sij(u, v) = max{−ui, aij′ − ui − vj′ , ∀j′ ∈M \ {j}} . Notice
that if j′ is also active then, taking into account the description of the core of
uniform–price assignment games given in (5), aij′ − ui − vj′ is constant for all core
allocations. This means that, since wA is buyer–seller exact, aij′ − ui − vj′ = 0 for
all core allocation (u, v) and all j′ active. By assumption, an active seller j′ 6= j
exists and so sij(u, v) = 0 . The same argument proves that sji(u, v) = 0 , and thus
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sij(u, v) = sji(u, v) .
To sum up, if more than one active pair exists, we have seen that for all (u, v) ∈
C(wA) and all (i, j) ∈ µ , sij(u, v) = sji(u, v) which means that C(wA) ⊆ K(wA) .
Since the other inclusion always holds, we have obtained in this case the coincidence
of the kernel with the core.
Assume now that A has only one active pair (i1, j1) ∈ µ . Since the kernel of an
arbitrary coalitional game is always nonempty, take (x, y) ∈ K(wA) . We then have
si1j1(x, y) = sj1i1(x, y) , (8)
where
si1j1(x, y) = max{−xi1 , ai1j − xi1 − yj, ∀j ∈M ′ \ {j1}}
sj1i1(x, y) = max{−yj1 , aij1 − xi − yj1 , ∀i ∈M \ {i1}} .
We will prove that (x, y) is the unique allocation in the kernel.
If there exist some (u, v) ∈ K(wA) , (x, y) 6= (u, v) , then, since K(wA) ⊆ C(wA) ,
both (x, y) and (u, v) must be of the form described in (5). Taking this into account
and the fact that I0 = M \ {i1} and J0 = M ′ \ {j1} , there exists ε′ > 0 such that
either ui1 = xi1 + ε
′ , ui = xi for all i ∈ M \ {i1} , vj1 = yj1 − ε′ and vj = yj for
all j ∈M ′ \ {j1} , or else ui1 = xi1 − ε′ , ui = xi for all i ∈M \ {i1} , vj1 = yj1 + ε′
and vj = yj for all j ∈M ′ \ {j1} . We will do the proof only in the first case, as the
second one is proved analogously.
Since M ′ \ {j1} = J0 and M \ {i1} = I0 , we get
si1j1(u, v) = max{−xi1 − ε′, ai1j − (xi1 + ε′)− yj, ∀j ∈M ′ \ {j1}} = si1j1(x, y)− ε′
and
sj1i1(u, v) = max{−yj1 + ε′, aij1 − xi − (yj1 − ε′), ∀i ∈M \ {i1}} = sj1i1(x, y) + ε′
Thus, si1j1(u, v) = sj1i1(u, v) if and only if ε
′ = 0 , and this means that (u, v)
coincides with (x, y) . 2
Notice that when there exists only one active pair and the kernel reduces to only
one point, this point is necessarily the nucleolus of the game (Schmeidler, 1969).
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Moreover, looking at some examples given before, we realize that both cases in the
theorem above can really happen. The game wA2 has only one active pair, while the
game wA3 has several active pairs.
A Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1: Recall from Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (2002) that all 2 × 2
assignment games are buyer-seller exact. Then, by Theorem 3, A = Ar = A + Ac
where Ac is an extended square glove market where acij = 0 if and only if i or j are
non-active in A . This means that, up to permutations of the buyers or the sellers,
either Ac = 0 and all agents are non-active, or Ac =
 c c
c c
 with c > 0 and all
agents are active, or Ac =
 c 0
0 0
 with c > 0 and only the first buyer and the
first seller are active. In the first two cases, by adding A , we obtain a 2× 2 matrix
with two optimal matchings, and thus a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market.
In the last case, Ar =
 c+ u1 + v1 u1 + v2
u2 + v1 u2 + v2
, and we claim that u2 = v2 =
0 . To see that, recall first that in every extreme core allocation of an assignment
game there is at least one agent who receives a null payoff (see Balinski and Gale,
1987). Since in this case (u, v) and (u, v) are two different extreme core allocations
there exists i ∈ {1, 2} such that ui = 0 and there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that vj = 0 .
If we assume that v2 > 0 , then it must hold v1 = 0 . Let us now consider u2 . By
equation (1), u2 is the marginal contribution of buyer 2 to the grand coalition but,
since this is a non-active agent, we know u2 = u2 . When computing this marginal
contribution we get
u2 = c+ u1 + v1 + u2 + v2 −max{c+ u1 + v1, u1 + v2}.
If the maximum is attained in c+u1+v1 , we have u2 = u2+v2 = u2 in contradiction
with v2 > 0 , and in the second case we obtain u2 = c + u2 = u2 , in contradiction
with c > 0 . Thus, v2 = 0 . The fact that u2 = 0 is proved analogously. This means
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that A = Ar =
 c+ u1 + v1 u1
v1 0
 and thus it is also a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse
market. 2
Proof of the Claim in Theorem 6: If A ∈Mm×m′(R+) is such that every
2×2 submatrix defines a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, then A also defines a Bo¨hm–
Bawerk horse market.
To prove the claim let us assume, without loss of generality, that rows and columns
have been ordered in such a way that a1j ≥ a1j+1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m′ − 1} ,
ai1 ≥ ai+11 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} and, moreover, a11 ≥ aij for all i ∈ M and
j ∈M ′ . Notice that this can always be achieved.
Under the assumption that all 2× 2 submatrices define Bo¨hm–Bawerk markets,
the above ordering implies that, for all i ∈M and j ∈M ′ , aij ≥ aij′ for all j′ ≥ j
and aij ≥ ai′j for all i′ ≥ i .
We prove the first inequality of the above statement (the second one is proved
analogously). Take j′ > j and consider the matrix A′ =
 a11 a1j
ai1 aij
 . As this
matrix defines a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, and because of the given orders in
the sets of buyers and sellers, if a1j = 0 , then aij = 0 . But on the other side, as
a1j ≥ a1j′ , we obtain a1j′ = 0 and since matrix
 a11 a1j′
ai1 aij′
 is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk
horse market, we deduce that aij′ = 0 and thus aij ≥ aij′ .
If a1j > 0 we will first see that a1j ≥ aij . As this is obvious when aij = 0 ,
let us assume aij > 0 . Then, since A
′ is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, we obtain
a11 + aij = a1j + ai1 , which from a11 ≥ ai1 implies a1j ≥ aij .
Now take matrix A′′ =
 a1j a1j′
aij aij′
 . If aij′ = 0 , then trivially aij ≥ aij′ . If
aij′ > 0 , since A
′′ is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse market, a1j + aij′ = aij + a1j′ which, as
a1j ≥ a1j′ , implies aij ≥ aij′ .
We now define valuations for buyers and sellers which show that A is a Bo¨hm–
Bawerk horse market.
Define hi = ai1 for all i ∈M and cj = a11− a1j for all j ∈M ′ . Let us consider
20
the submarket A′ =
 a11 a1j
ai1 aij
 which, by assumption, is a Bo¨hm–Bawerk horse
market. If aij > 0 , then A
′ > 0 and
max{hi − cj, 0} = max{ai1 − (a11 − a1j), 0} = max{aij, 0} = aij .
If aij = 0 , then a11 ≥ a1j + ai1 , which means
max{hi − cj, 0} = max{ai1 − (a11 − a1j), 0} = 0 = aij .
2
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